Hopes for an internationally-backed ground offensive in Yemen to dislodge Ansarullah, better known as the Houthis, from Yemen’s western coast have been dashed by the group’s unexpected deal with the US earlier this month, brokered by Oman.

After 51 days of confrontation, President Donald Trump announced a halt to US offensive operations against the Houthis in return for a suspension of attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab Strait—particularly those tied to American interests. The move appears aimed at securing a face-saving shift away from confrontation amid escalating costs for both sides. It also underscores the erratic course of US foreign policy and effectively decouples the Red Sea front from the wider Houthi-Israel conflict.

Ultimately, the arrangement falls far short of a coherent US strategy toward Yemen and risks emboldening the Houthis—both at home and across the region.

 

The Stockholm Agreement

In the lead-up to the May 6 agreement between Ansarullah and the US, signs pointed to a looming wider battle in Yemen. On Mar. 29, Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad Mohammad Al-Alimi hinted at a possible ground offensive during his Eid Al-Fitr address to the nation. Weeks later, on Apr. 14, western media reported that talks were underway on a limited US-backed, but Yemeni-led, ground operation to retake the Houthi-held port city of Hodeidah.

Seven years after British and US interventions played a key role in preventing the internationally-recognized Yemeni government from moving to retake Hodeidah, pro-government forces may be poised to reopen that front again.

In 2018, the Yemeni government had the military upper hand but was constrained by the Stockholm Agreement, which ultimately entrenched Houthi control over the strategic Red Sea port. That concession paved the way for the Iranian-backed Yemeni group to later be able to attack commercial vessels, prompting an Anglo-American military response that began under the Joe Biden administration in Jan. 2024 and escalated sharply by Trump in March this year.

Momentum to address Yemen’s power imbalance remains stalled—constrained in part by regional dynamics, particularly Saudi Arabia’s strategic caution, shifting threat perception and socio-economic priorities. These dimensions reflect two core realities: a clear-eyed reading of Trump’s first term and a pragmatic Saudi focus on advancing national interests above all else.

 

A shift in perception amid high costs

Since late 2023, the Houthis have launched over 200 attacks on commercial and military vessels across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean—at times in reported coordination with Somali pirates. Notably, the group has also fired more than 200 missiles and 170 drones toward Israel, with some of the projectiles inadvertently striking neighboring countries including Egypt,  Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The Houthi operations—ostensibly launched in support of the Palestinian cause and a ceasefire in Gaza—have forced global shipping companies to reroute vessels. Many ships have since been compelled to traverse the Cape of Good Hope, bypassing the Red Sea and Suez Canal and in the process adding up to two weeks in transit time. The pressure on Red Sea littoral states has been mounting: Egypt, for example, reported a 7B USD loss in Suez Canal revenue in 2024. By February this year, daily transits through the canal had fallen to just 32 ships—a 57% decline from the average of 75 prior to the launch of Houthi naval strikes.

The crisis has directly challenged the international maritime order and raises questions about the ability—and willingness—of the US to consistently uphold freedom of navigation. The Houthis have repositioned themselves as a credible threat to global peace, trade and security, engendering a shift in US threat perceptions after years of downplaying the group’s layered threats.

 

An Inadequate American approach

Trump has adopted a somewhat more focused approach to Yemen in comparison with Biden, but his stance still lacks strategy and overall coherence. With the weakening of Lebanese Hezbollah, the fall of former president Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and the restraint of Iran-backed Shiite armed groups in Iraq since last autumn, the Houthis have until recently chosen escalation over survival. The shifting regional landscape initially led the Trump administration to conclude that it was the right moment to escalate against the group.

Beginning on Mar. 15 and until the announcement of a truce on May 6, the US launched over 1,100 strikes targeting Houthi drone and missile workshops, storage facilities, military bases, radar systems, the homes of mid-level leaders, mobile military gatherings, launch pads and even civilian infrastructure, including Ras Issa port. The attacks are claimed to have killed more than 500 Houthi fighters, though they have also resulted in heavy civilian casualties and other collateral damage.

US deterrence has yet to be credibly or sustainably restored, as the Houthis continue to show both the capability and intent to carry out further attacks—underscored by their ongoing exchanges of fire with Israel.

But for the first time since the Stockholm Agreement, the group appears genuinely vulnerable. Following a relatively minor Houthi strike on Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport on May 4, Israeli retaliation destroyed critical logistical and power infrastructure in Yemen—including four civilian aircraft owned by Yemeni Airways—highlighting the heavy toll on an already devastated civilian population. Informed sources in Yemen also report that senior Houthi commanders have gone into hiding, triggering abrupt changes in communication and security protocols amid mounting fears of cyber infiltration and leaks from human intelligence.

Yemeni sources on the ground additionally allege that live targeting information was shared with the US from within Houthi-held areas—an unprecedented breach that points to mounting public discontent. Popular frustration is driven not only by Ansarullah’s repressive rebel governance, monopolization of power and economic mismanagement, but also by the increasingly visible costs of its regional adventurism for Yemenis at home and abroad.

Strikes such as the US bombing of Ras Issa Port in Hodeidah have taken a heavy toll on civilians, compounding the suffering of those whose hopes rest on de-escalation, improved living conditions and enhanced security.

 

Stockholm’s mistakes repeated

The prospect of Washington’s readiness to take more decisive action to safeguard international shipping hinges on two key factors: progress in the Iran-US nuclear talks and Houthi compliance with the May 6 truce. Prior to the Houthi-US arrangement, American strikes on frontline positions in Hodeidah and Ma’rib—as well as on infrastructure near strategic islands like Kamaran—suggested a broader strategy to secure naval supply lines and pressure the Houthis into talks.

Meanwhile, the Yemeni government still hopes for an internationally-backed offensive to ultimately retake Sana’a, seeing it as the only path for  lasting stability—including in the Red Sea. Yet the ceasefire deal has exposed the Trump administration’s preference for a narrower approach: containing Houthi maritime threats temporarily, degrading their capabilities and forcing them to the negotiating table.

While costly, a more decisive US response against the Houthis could prove strategic. Recapturing a more than 300 km (186 miles) stretch of the Tihama region—a narrow coastal plain along the Red Sea from the Saudi border to near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait—would sever the Houthis' western supply artery as well as disrupt arms, fuel, mercenary and drug smuggling routes. It would additionally neutralize threats from naval mines and explosive-laden boats, and confine the group to the highlands—significantly undermining their operational reach and resilience.

This is not the time to repeat the mistakes of the Stockholm Agreement, which protected the Houthis, normalized their presence in Hodeidah and allowed maritime threats to grow unchecked. Yet today, there remains a real risk of repeating the same fundamental error: namely to treat symptoms rather than addressing root causes.

 

The Abu Dhabi- Riyadh dimension

Regional calculations on a land offensive against the Houthis remain divided and represent a critical constraint. Saudi Arabia, wary of Trump’s unpredictability and vulnerability to Houthi cross-border attacks, demands a comprehensive American security pact and remains skeptical of launching a ground operation. Riyadh is also concerned about the potential expansion of Emirati influence along the Red Sea.

However, the UAE—leveraging its operational experience near Hodeidah in 2017–18 along with its enduring ties with the Joint Forces on the Tehama Coast —is more willing to support a US-backed ground offensive, if it were to be strategic. Abu Dhabi’s strong security partnership with Washington—coupled with energy and maritime interests and quest for geopolitical influence—drive its position, despite initial public denials.

Looking ahead, one thing is clear: the Red Sea crisis underscores Houthi resilience—not because of the group’s inherent strength, but due to the absence of an internationally-backed and Yemeni-led stabilization strategy and the persistent failure to address the root causes of cross-border threats. The latter entails Houthi territorial control and refusal to meaningfully engage in national peace processes.

Meeting this challenge requires a coherent and long-term Yemen–Red Sea strategy, anchored in sustained military, financial, intelligence, security, diplomatic and logistical support for the Yemeni government—in close coordination with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While the Trump administration has expressed a desire for lasting peace and stability in the Red Sea, it does not however appear ready for the longer-term engagement that could usher a new era in Yemen. In this context, renewed talks on the UN-sponsored de-escalation roadmap, backed by Oman and Saudi Arabia, appear increasingly likely.